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Abstract
Background: Alcohol-related violence is associated with licensed premise environments and their management.
There is a lack of evidence for effective interventions to address these, and there are significant barriers to
implementation. This study aims to understand how development and implementation processes can facilitate
intervention reach, fidelity and receipt and therefore provides key process data necessary to interpret the results of
the randomised controlled trial conducted in parallel.
Methods: A process evaluation, embedded within a randomised controlled trial. Intervention development and
implementation were assessed via focus groups (n = 2) and semi-structured interviews (n = 22) with Environmental
Health Practitioners (EHPs). Reach and fidelity were assessed via routinely collected intervention data, which was
was collected from 276 licenced premises across Wales, UK. Case study semi-structured interviews with licensed
premises proprietors (n = 30) explored intervention receipt.
Results: Intervention co-production with senior EHPs facilitated organisational adoption and implementation.
Training events for EHPs played an important role in addressing wider organisational concerns regarding
partnership working and the contextual integration of the intervention. EHPs delivered the intervention to 98 % of
intervention premises; 35 % of premises should have received a follow up enforcement visit, however EHP
confidence in dealing with alcohol risk factors meant only 7 % of premises received one. Premises therefore
received a similar intervention dose regardless of baseline risk. Intervention receipt appeared to be greatest in
premises with an existing commitment to prevention and those in urban environments.
Conclusions: The study suggests that a collaborative approach to the development and diffusion of interventions
is associated with high levels of organisational adoption, implementation and reach. However, the lack of
enforcement visits represents implementation failure for a key mechanism of action that is likely to influence
intervention effectiveness. To be effective, any future intervention may require a longer implementation period to
develop EHP confidence in using enforcement approaches in this area and multiagency enforcement support,
which includes the police, to deliver an adequate intervention dose.
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Background
The close attention paid by policy makers to the night
time economy in the United Kingdom (UK) [1] reflects
the rising numbers of city-centre licensed premises [2],
the increasing levels of concern about violence in such
premises [3], and the emergence of a culture shared with
many other countries where excessive alcohol consump-
tion and alcohol-related disorder are tolerated [4].
Alcohol-related harm is now estimated to cost the UK in
excess of £21 billion a year [5]. Health costs form a sig-
nificant part of this [5–7] and alcohol-related harm in
night time environments are responsible for an esti-
mated 70 % of all unscheduled Accident and Emergency
(A&E) attendances [5–8]. This has led to urgent calls for
interventions to reduce levels of alcohol-related harm in
the UK and further afield [9, 10].
Alcohol-related violence in the night-time economy is
influenced by numerous factors, many of which can be
found in and around public houses, bars and clubs
across the world [9–11]. These influences include
crowding, poor premise upkeep, inappropriate layout,
low lighting levels, excessive noise, poor ventilation, irre-
sponsible alcohol promotions, inadequate responsible
server training, poor in-house policy and poor adherence
to licensing conditions [10–12]. ‘Broken Windows The-
ory’ (BWT) [13, 14] suggest that addressing such factors
can reduce alcohol-related violence, as motivation to of-
fend is informed by situational cues such as graffiti, va-
cant buildings and broken or boarded windows that
indicate an absence of capable guardians and a want of
social order defined as “organised responses to crime,
delinquency and allied forms of deviant and/or socially
problematic behaviour that are actually conceived of as
such” [15] and so “identify convenient places to commit
crime” [16]. In this way, social control is a central com-
ponent in understanding the way violence arises in night
time environment. Within this, distinctions are made be-
tween 'formal' and 'informal' social controls; the former
relating to interventions enacted by agencies of the state
usually under the auspices of legal authority (e.g. the po-
lice), while the latter is concerned with the regulatory
and social ordering function performed by citizens (in-
cluding bar staff and private security).
A systematic review of factors associated with alcohol-
related harm concluded that interventions targeting re-
sponsible beverage service training, community mobil-
isation, improved premises policies and enforcing
existing licensing laws may be most effective [12]. Des-
pite this, rigorous randomised controlled trials (RCT) of
the effectiveness of licensed premises interventions to
address environmental factors remain limited.
In light of this and following the Medical Research
Council Framework for complex evaluations [17], a
feasibility trial of a premise-level intervention to reduce
alcohol related violence in licensed premises in Wales
was piloted [18]. The intervention consisted of an audit
of premise risk-factors and a subsequent action plan to
address identified factors. Although study findings dem-
onstrated that the intervention had potential, they also
suggested formal, rather than informal, enforcement in
this policy-led intervention would be more likely to pro-
duce positive effects [19]. It was concluded that any subse-
quent intervention should be implemented by authorities
who hold regulatory powers and who are trained to con-
duct work-place risk assessments to reduce crime and
disorder-related violence in work settings. The Environ-
mental Health Agency in Wales was approached and and
agreement was reached that they would collaborate on the
implementation of an All Wales Licensed Premises Inter-
vention (AWLPI). The intervention that was delivered
was called SMILE (Safety Management in Licensed Estab-
lishments’) and a randomized controlled trial method-
ology was adopted.
This paper presents results from an embedded process
evaluation that aimed to explore intervention develop-
ment, implementation and the subsequent reach, fidelity
and receipt of the intervention. In so doing it provides
key process data that can facilitate an understanding of
main trial outcomes and establishes what works, for
whom and in what context.
Methods
Research design
A longitudinal process evaluation that examined the de-
velopment and implementation of the intervention. This
was nested within a RCT comparing violence in inter-
vention and control groups of licensed premises (public
houses, nightclubs or hotels with a public bar) with a
history of violence, ethical approval was provided by the
Cardiff University Dental School’s Research Ethics
Committee.
Intervention
The SMILE intervention (Fig. 1) was co-produced with
senior EHPs and consisted of a risk-audit and action/en-
forcement plan for premises identified as at risk for vio-
lence based on previous incidents in police data. This
was delivered by EHPs and supported by a DVD and
web-site and provided educational films promoting
awareness and due diligence among premises staff. The
risk-audit completed by EHPs aimed to identify and
highlight areas of premises operation associated with in-
creased levels of alcohol-related violence. The Audit was
developed from the literature documenting features of
premises that contribute to harm and were shaped so
that opportunities to inform change were consistent
with the statutory powers EHPs have available to them.
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EHPs work mostly with the Health and Safety at Work
Act. While licensed premises are covered by the Health
and Safety at Work Act there is also specific legislation
for the alcohol industry, the 2003 Licensing Act and it is
the Licensing Act that is mostly used to regulate licensed
premises. For these reasons, EHPs had little direct ex-
perience of working with licensed premises and it was
therefore necessary to develop intervention materials
that worked within EHPs statutory competencies but
was also able to translate the available evidence and the-
ory in this area into a workable format.
The Health and Safety at Work Act played a funda-
mental role in SMILE development as under this legisla-
tion all businesses with five or more employees are
obliged to have a written policy that describes how risks
are identified and managed, all businesses are expected
to conduct risk assessments and take reasonable actions
to reduce risk. This risk assessment therefore provides
the point through which formal control (i.e. Health and
Safety at Work Act and the Licensing Act) can operate
to increase informal governance whereby premise man-
agers work to identify areas in which harm, including
alcohol-related harm (e.g. dealing with intoxicated and
disorderly customers), might arise and what can be done
to minimise those risks. These risks should be reviewed
regularly and employees are expected to be aware of
what measures are in place. Dissemination is through
formal induction processes for new employees and
regular refresher or training sessions for existing staff.
The Health and Safety at Work Act therefore provides
an important opportunity to manage risk in licensed
premises and encourages appropriate informal govern-
ance across the entire premises environment.
The risk audit examined 11 operational domains: re-
cords management, visibility and lighting, health and
safety, surveillance, noise and communication, risk plan-
ning, door management, managing people, managing
disorderly patrons, staff training, incident reporting and
glassware policy. Each of the 11 sections included a Risk
Control Indicator (RCI) score. The RCI is a standard in-
strument used by EHPs to record their perceived level of
risk in the area under scrutiny. RCI scales ranged from
zero to six: a score of one represents a situation where
the EHP believed that no further improvements were
possible (based on current legislation and guidance),
scores of two and three represent situations where ver-
bal or written feedback may be appropriate, four or
higher denotes situations where enforcement action, an
improvement or prohibition notice, is required. Zero de-
notes “not applicable”. For enforcement actions, EHPs
were required to perform a follow up visit to check com-
pliance. Each operational domain required EHPs to rec-
ord any action they had taken (none, verbal advice,
written advice, the issuing of an improvement notice or
a prohibition notice). EHPs also recorded whether a fol-
low up visit had been completed.
Organisational adoption was promoted by three train-
ing days for EHPs held across Wales. The training days
consisted of presentations by medical consultants, who
highlighted the extent and severity of injuries related to
violence in the night time economy; academic staff, who
presented the rationale, aims and objectives of the
SMILE evaluation and senior EHPs, who presented and
discussed the SMILE risk-audit in detail. Seventy-four
EHPs attended and SMILE audit tools and contact de-
tails for 300 allocated intervention premises were dis-
tributed to Local Authority Environmental Health teams
after the training event.
Sampling and recruitment
The process evaluation explored SMILE development
and implementation with senior EHPs and a sample of
EHPs who delivered SMILE. Four senior EHPs involved
in intervention development were invited to take part
verbally; information sheets and consent forms were
completed at one of the regular research group meet-
ings. Seventy-five EHPs took part in SMILE delivery. Of
these, one practitioner from each Local Authority in
Wales was randomly sampled and invited to participate
in the process evaluation. The sample included three
practitioners who had not attended SMILE training (n =
22). EHP recruitment took place by email or telephone,
Fig. 1 Implementation of SMILE
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with information and consent forms supplied and returned
electronically, no refusals were received.
A RCT with embedded economic and process evalua-
tions in 600 premises was undertaken. Premises were
randomly assigned (1:1), balanced for history of violence,
opening hours and Local Authority EHP capacity, to ei-
ther the intervention group or usual practice. All prem-
ises with a history of violence in the 12 months
preceding the project were eligible. EHPs were masked
to usual practice premises (but aware of intervention
practices). To explore intervention receipt and its rela-
tionship to normal practice within premises, a sample of
premises were drawn from control and intervention
premises. As wide a range of study premises as feasibly
possible were included, and although study resources
precluded any selection by randomisation, care was
taken to ensure premises were selected from across
Wales and represented the stratification criteria. Recruit-
ment continued until theoretical saturation was
achieved. This resulted in data collected from 30 prem-
ises (Table 1).
Data collection
Senior EHPs (n = 4) took part in two separate focus
groups. One focus group, conducted after the interven-
tion development phase, explored the role of the senior
EHPS in the co-production of SMILE and its impact on
organisational adoption. The second, which took place
after SMILE delivery, investigated managerial perspec-
tives on implementation.
Semi-structured telephone interviews were conducted
with EHPs (n = 22). The interviews explored EHP know-
ledge of and role in addressing alcohol-related violence
in licensed premises before SMILE began, the role of the
training day in facilitating organisational adoption of
SMILE and the experiences of EHPs during implementa-
tion of the intervention. Further detail of intervention
reach, fidelity and dose was assessed through routine
data collected as part of the intervention audit and ac-
tion plan.
Interviews with premise managers/owners (n = 30)
were conducted face to face when possible (n = 18) or by
telephone (n = 12). The interviews collected information
about managers/owners experiences of alcohol-related
violence and usual action taken to address this issue. In
addition intervention premise managers/owners were
asked about receipt of SMILE. All semi-structured inter-
views were held shortly after the intervention phase had
ended.
Analysis
Interviews and focus groups were recorded, transcribed,
anonymised and entered into password-protected files
before analysis using NVivo 10. The first phase of ana-
lysis involved transcript scrutiny and the categorisation
of data into dominant themes determined a priori and
explored by semi-structured interviews. Audit risk scores
and subsequent actions were used to assess the reach, fi-
delity and dose of the intervention as delivered
Results
Intervention development and professional competencies
SMILE was adopted as an Environmental Health project
after a series of meetings with senior managers who
identified a clear link between the intervention and
existing professional skills and competencies. However,
reaction of the wider environmental health practitioner
body to SMILE highlighted concerns with dealing with
alcohol as a new area in which they lacked skills and
experience.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the implementation
of SMILE.
During early meetings between academics and organ-
isational managers, description of the feasibility study
led to recognition that SMILE would map well onto
current EHP work practices, ‘I thought “that sounds like
some the work that we do, so how come we are not joined
up and doing something together?” (Senior EHP2). These
meetings also improved academic understanding of the
organisational context and the remits of routine EHP
practice ‘investigating accidents.... umm, they educate,
they work in partnership with groups, other stakeholders
who have an interest in public health or the health of the
environment’ (Senior EHP1).
Subsequent discussion revolved around the design and
delivery of SMILE. Organisational managers suggested
that Health and Safety EHPs should implement the
intervention, as these specialists were likely to have
gained useful experience in RIDDOR (Reporting of In-
juries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations,
Table 1 Licensed premises sample
Premises Area (Wales) Location and Violence Strata
Urban Town/Fringe Rural
North West South East High Low High Low High Low
Total (N = 30) 4 2 24 8 6 3 10 1 2
Intervention (N = 16) 2 1 13 5 3 1 6 0 1
Control (N = 14) 2 1 11 3 3 2 4 1 1
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2013) investigations, and in ‘an [earlier] alcohol and vio-
lence project, not necessarily for Licensed Premises, but
in book makers, uhh night clubs....restaurants as well
(Senior EHP1). Further deliberation about possible
changes needed to adapt the risk-audit intervention to
the environmental health context resulted in the agree-
ment of senior EHPs to co-produce SMILE to ensure
the audit mapped onto existing working practices as
closely as possible.
For the wider EHP community, although all Local Au-
thorities had chosen to participate in SMILE, half of the
EHPs (n = 11) interviewed felt inclusion had been im-
posed. Despite such perceptions of a ‘forced adoption’, a
recognised barrier to implementation [19, 20], most
EHPs anticipated that SMILE may progress their work
into a new legitimate arena ‘we are a responsible author-
ity for licensed premises I don’t think that we are finding
out enough about what is happening at these premises…
and if they are not managing violence at their premises
then I think that is something that we should be doing’
(EHP19).
The greatest practitioner concern at this stage was en-
vironmental health involvement in SMILE as the sole
delivery agency ‘licensing might have been better placed
to deal with this’ (EHP22). Some local authority EHPs
addressed this by consulting licensing colleagues and
making joint visits to premises. Additional concerns
were associated with confidence in dealing with alcohol
as a new area ‘we would deal with violence but not
specifically alcohol-related violence and certainly we
wouldn’t have had a role with regards alcohol-related
violence between customers’ (EHP8).
Contrary to managerial belief, levels of previous ex-
perience in addressing work-related violence amongst
EHPs were found to be low. A quarter of practitioners
maintained they had little experience in this type of
work: ‘it wasn’t something that we really, we didn’t look
at really’ (EHP1). Of those who had experience, eleven
had gained little within licensed premises ‘I wouldn’t say
they was a massive emphasis on it, you know we may
look at, if we were going to a licensed premises’ (EHP17).
Of the remaining five practitioners, only one had worked
on a local project similar to AWLPI `through local
knowledge and police statistics, I targeted out problem
areas and visited all of those’ (EHP5). Others had
worked with or as part of local authority multi-agency
teams, with involvement ranging from occasional ‘they
meet on a regular basis, now as environmental health of-
ficers we don’t sit on that on a regular basis’ (EHP12) to
fuller integration ‘we apply this scheme in [X] … it basic-
ally looks at all the issues in terms of NTE, sort of drink-
ing related, alcohol related problems, under age sales, all
these kinds of things’ (EHP10). It was also discovered that
EHPs had conducted little ARV work through RIDDOR
‘to be honest I don’t recall ever having one’ (EHP13).
Despite these findings, there was no suggestion that
EHPs felt lack of experience in these fields would pose
barriers to project adoption and participation and these
issues were subsequently addressed during training for
organisational adoption.
Organisational adoption
Following intervention co-production, EHPs from every
Welsh Local Authority attended training days that aimed
to familiarise them with the intervention and ensure
they held the requisite knowledge and skills to deliver
the intervention.
Seventy-four EHPs attended the training days, such
high attendance promoted the organisational reach of
SMILE. The majority of EHPs felt the research team
gave ‘good insight to the background, you know to see
where it comes from, the thought behind it and, you
know, what you hoped to achieve from doing the project’
(EHP2), whilst clinicians offered ‘the visual sort of dis-
plays of injuries that were, in A&E from the, from the
medical practitioner that was on site, was, was quite…
Well it was hard hitting’ (EHP5). Overall the training ap-
peared to raise motivation to deliver the intervention
‘and it did, you know, sort of get me sort of more enthusias-
tic about trying to tackle it’ (EHP5). The co-production of
SMILE also proved important in facilitating adoption and
implementation ‘because our colleagues had been involved
in it from the start that did help because you know you
weren’t sort of actually preaching to people who had no
sort of feedback from peers’ (EHP10), and producing an
intervention that met existing skill sets ‘the actual forms I
think are pretty self-explanatory in terms of you know fill-
ing them in, obviously you know we are used to going on
site and taking various different forms with us you know’
(EHP17). Even for EHPs who did not attend the training ‘I
had a look through [the risk-audit] myself and any ques-
tions that I had about it I could ask my colleagues and
they would sort of clear it’ (EHP6).
Despite the generally positive response, some concerns
remained about the licensing agency exclusion ‘the vio-
lence and the procedures around that with regards to
CCTV and all that would have been better suited to licens-
ing’ (EHP18) and ‘it would have been nice to have had the
feedback and the input from the licensing officer side of it’
(EHP15), with a minority concerned as ‘we don’t want to
step on their [licensing] toes!’ (EHP18). This highlighted
the importance of agency boundaries in maintaining work
practices and relationships [21, 22], and supported the
need for EHPs to adapt the intervention to further assimi-
late it into their routine practice [23].
Most EHPs were also impressed by the supportive
web-site and films during training days ‘I felt that I could
say to the publicans oh you know it does give you a lot of
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good information, you know such as Challenge 25. And
so I thought there was a lot of good information on the
DVD,’ (EHP2). However two voiced concerns about one
section of one film ‘as a team we were slightly horrified
by the contents of the training video which you know indi-
cated that premises should put staff into harm’s way in
order to protect customers, which is just abhorrent, it is just
everything that we would advise against’ (EHP8): these
practitioners did not promote the videos extensively.
Intervention implementation
The co-production approach appeared to produce an ac-
ceptable and usable intervention with audit data and re-
ports of SMILE delivery from both EHPs and premise
managers/owners suggesting significant intervention
reach and high levels of fidelity for the risk audit. How-
ever, concerns regarding the fidelity of action plan im-
plementation and subsequent intervention dose, due to
low levels of enforcement visits emerged. Low levels of
concerns about the relevance of the intervention to all
premises were also found.
Intervention reach
Although the delivery of SMILE by EHPs led to signifi-
cant intervention reach (98 %), a number of premises
closed down before the intervention was delivered, and a
small number proved uncontactable or refused to par-
ticipate. Of the 300 original intervention premises se-
lected, 92 were ineligible owing to premises closure and
four refused. Within refusals, one was attributed to an
ongoing prosecution, another landlord declined because
he had recently been part of a similar project, a further
because he felt that SMILE selection reflected poorly on
the premises: ‘he got quite upset about it and I think [re-
search team member] got involved as well and you know
he had to send you know an apology out’ (EHP21). The
final refusal was based on disbelief: ‘Why are you here?
You know I can’t remember the last time there was even
an incident’ (EHP22). This feeling was shared by man-
agers of many premises in rural or quiet locations.
Overall, EHPs delivered the intervention to 69 % of
the initial sample. As per protocol, replacement premises
for premises closures and refusals were allocated. In
total EHPs delivered SMILE to all but four of the avail-
able intervention premises that were open and could be
contacted. Such a high implementation rate is consistent
with studies in other areas involving statutory partners
and strengthens the evidence that agents without legal
powers are inferior when compared with those that do
have legal power [24, 25]. Indeed, nearly all managers
consulted reported feeling obligated to co-operate with
authorities: ‘it’s going to happen, so may as well go with
it’ (DPS 342).
Implementation fidelity
EHPs delivered the risk audit as prescribed. Most EHPs
found the risk-audit easy to use ‘the layout and every-
thing was all sort of easy to use and I thought that it was
fine’ (EHP1). All referred to the audit guidance during
scoring, and some used it exclusively ‘we just utilised
your guidance’ (EHP9), but many drew on previous
experience and/or interaction with premises staff ‘how
responsive they are to what you are talking about. There
is no point in serving notices on somebody who is very
willing and very happy to put things in place’ (EHP7).
Individual approaches to risk audit delivery varied: some
practitioners used more open attitudes ‘they were always
looking at what you were writing and stuff, and it was
quite easy for then for me to explain to them with the
tick boxes’ (EHP11) than others ‘I would fill in the pro-
forma and then come back and do my scores back in the
office, so I wouldn’t say to them at the end because obvi-
ously that would be quite confrontational’ (EHP7). Few
problems in promoting the website and DVD were
reported although the two practitioners who had held
concerns about the advice in one film had distributed
DVDs with warnings to ignore the section.
Risk audit data results and resulting action/enforce-
ment plans provide a measure of the dose delivered to
each premises. Risk control indicator scales across 11
domains ranged from zero to six, where a score of zero
denotes "not applicable" (these scores were dropped
from summary statistics), scores of two to three would
suggest verbal or written advice and scores of four to six
would warrant enforcement actions and follow up visits.
Figure 2 highlights results from the Risk Control Indicator
Scores and shows that the areas requiring most attention
Fig. 2 Risk Audit scores
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included record keeping (including written risk assess-
ments), health and safety, and incident reporting.
Figure 3 shows the count of advice given by type of
advice (verbal or written). Each premises could be given
verbal or written advice for each of the eleven areas cov-
ered by the audit. In total, premises could receive a max-
imum of eleven items of verbal and eleven items of
written advice. This histogram presents the number of
premises by the total number of verbal and written items
received. These data suggest that verbal advice was used
more often and for more areas of interest in the audit
than written advice.
The majority (57.6 %) received verbal and supporting
written advice. Significantly, although 35 % should have
received an enforcement action and follow up based on
their risk audit scores, only 18 (7 %) of premises received
one, with EHPs only reverting to more formal proce-
dures when actions were not made or legislation had
been compromised’with issues then which I did pick up
on it was written advice, I didn’t need to take any further
enforcement action after the written advice and re-
visiting them, they had done all the, you know they had
done all the issues which I had picked up’ (EHP6). Most
follow-up visits were related to health and safety checks
(n = 13) and staff training (n = 13).
Intervention receipt
Half of the EHPs felt premises reacted positively to
SMILE ‘all of them were accommodating and you know
quite a few of them were actually happy then …because
…maybe they hadn’t had an inspection or visit off us for
you know a number of years’ (EHP6). Some practitioners
ascribed this to the statutory nature of visits, others to
pre-existing positive relationships with premises. Owners
supported this view, ‘if you are doing it with the local au-
thority you know that you have covered everything and
there is nothing that you have missed out yourself ’
(LP336). In general, EHPs reported that managers of
large, often chain premises, tended to react more posi-
tively as SMILE fitted in well with established routines
‘some of the bigger ones … where they have got good proce-
dures in place and well trained managers and a well-run
place that are receptive to it‘(EHP3) with poorer responses
often coming from long-time owners of smaller pubs ‘they
said ‘have you ever worked in a pub’ and I said ‘no’, ‘well’
they said ‘well there we are, I have worked in a pub for
30 years, I know exactly what goes on here, I know exactly
what to look for” (EHP3).
Such descriptions of mixed SMILE reception were
confirmed by the accounts of 16 intervention premise
owners/managers (n =7 chain, n = 9 independent). For
their part, most were convinced issues were already be-
ing addressed adequately by established in-house pol-
icies, practices and training ‘all I have got to do is phone
head office, and they are like there with an answer’
(LP347). However, it is worth noting that this opinion
was not universal: four managers of chain premises, in-
cluding two where SMILE had identified no area(s) of
concern, felt that the intervention had been beneficial as
it has raised personal awareness of alcohol-related vio-
lence and refocused attention on the issue ‘it pushes me
to the right direction, that you have got to be focused on
these types of things you know’ (LP84).
Furthermore, some proprietors noted that SMILE had
encouraged maintenance of present standards and up-
dated knowledge ‘fresh eyes, do you know what I am say-
ing, so I mean and anything new or anything I mean it is
like if I have been here six years and … maybe, she will
come and say oh why don’t you try it that way because it
is a fresh idea you know. Sometimes so anything new
really is always a good idea I think’ (LP124). For inde-
pendents, despite one premise reacting very positively, ‘I
don’t have the information and there are lots of different
things she brought with her, booklets and that as well but
Fig. 3 Audit action plan count of advice given by type
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especially that DVD….., it has just highlighted different
zones. ….and I say ok I am taking time out here now and
I am doing this and showing the staff this as well, and it
is all good isn’t it really. It is positive’ (LP131), a signifi-
cant number were unhappy at the idea of receiving
SMILE. A couple of owners insisted the intervention
had no place in their premises and represented an un-
welcome burden ‘I suppose if you hadn’t ticked a lot of
the boxes then yes it would be an eye opener and it
would be of value. But personally speaking I had a lot of
the work already done’ (LP179). Others participated
without complaint, gave SMILE little thought afterwards,
and did not see increased EHP involvement positively
‘once is bad enough!’ (LP100).
Participants managing urban premises also appeared
as more responsive to the intervention, with all agreeing
that alcohol related violence was an established problem,
and most feeling the situation had worsened in recent
years with escalating drugs use compounding matters ‘It
has got a lot worse over the last few years because there
is so much, there is so much drugs in the valleys now it’s
sort of an accumulation of the two’ (LP174). Despite this,
a minority working in town environments described al-
cohol related violence as something that occurred out-
side of their premises or responsibility ‘people walking
down from [X] Street two of them seen each other…. his-
tory of a feud between them and they started fighting
outside. And it has ended up our doormen have got in-
volved because it is literally our doorstep and other
people have got, and it just escalated and escalated and
it was my doorman that got into trouble for it - for step-
ping off their door’ (LP336) or as a consequence of indi-
viduals drinking elsewhere; either at other premises or
through preloading. The inference that premises prefer
to distance themselves from customer violence, was re-
inforced by comments such as ‘The biggest issue is once
people have become intoxicated is having the foresight, as
managers and door staff, to remove those people from the
venue’ (LP28). Such comment supports evidence that
violence and aggression are often displaced onto the
street [23] and strengthens calls for some premises to be
given stronger support to help them take responsibility
for their role in alcohol related violence.
Intervention reconfiguration
Most EHPs felt SMILE had been worthwhile, had had a
beneficial impact on the knowledge and practices of
EHPs, and fitted with routine work practices. Some sug-
gestions to improve targeting, enforcement and sustain-
ability were also offered.
There was wide agreement amongst EHPs that SMILE
fitted the organisational context well ‘seems to be cer-
tainly something that would tie in naturally with the
Health and Safety at Work Act’ (EHP20) with the
importance of sustaining and integrating this work into
professional practice rather than being a ‘one off ’ inter-
vention stressed ‘I know from like, from personal experi-
ence and they have got good intentions for that, the next
few months and then it sort of slips off and it goes off
their agenda and then something else’ (EHP13).
In contrast, owners and managers were surprised to
find EHPs delivering SMILE. Regardless of this, after re-
ceiving SMILE most felt EHPs had a role in assessing
risk factors given their knowledge and statutory powers
‘you would make double sure that, you know on that
night, you know, it is one of those things that you
shouldn’t work like this, you do you just say I will go and
double check,’ (LP 308). EHPs agreed that statutory powers
encouraged actions within premises ‘these interventions
highlight the issue to the managing agent and as a result,
as is generally the case when we book an assessment, the
first thing those in control of the business does is review
their own risk assessments on that subject’ (EHP8).
Further reflection produced some suggestions for
SMILE reconfiguration. A major concern stemmed from
the data used to identify participant premises. Although
virtually all EHPs felt the premises visited had been rep-
resentative of their areas, over half felt the wrong prem-
ises had been selected ‘some of the ones perhaps that I
would have classed as being a problem pubs weren’t
within that list….. I know that obviously it is a random
controlled trial …but the ones that we know we have had
issues with, it would be nice to know, well if we do some-
thing with that pub will it make that much of a differ-
ence’ (EHP5). Many respondents agreed and felt SMILE
effectiveness would have been increased if delivery had
been confined to premises whose managers had little ex-
perience or knowledge of alcohol-related violence and
how to minimise it: ‘the ones that weren’t part of a
chain, independent, no controls, ones with no, no real un-
derstanding’ (EHP22), or which were known to have lar-
ger levels of problematic behaviours and violence. Many
EHPs suspected that the police violence records were
unreliable ‘you said that a lot of the data came through
from the police but when I checked up, certainly on the
one pub they had nothing, there was nothing against it
whatsoever’ (EHP7). Police violence records were also
criticised for associating incidents with nearby premises
‘three of the pubs in particular, they have called the po-
lice for problems outside the premises, you know it is
nothing to do with their premises but yet they are, you
know they are brought up on the list’ (EHP3) and for not
differentiating between police attendance to prevent
trouble as oppose to managing on-going violence ‘people
believed they were serving under age but they were very
pro-active in wanting to kind of clean that up…and I
think that is why they had a higher number of police
incidents’ (EHP18).
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Post-implementation, questions about the legitimacy
of environmental health being the sole agents of SMILE
delivery remained, and the feeling that SMILE should
have included licensing officers had strengthened ‘a lot
of things that sort of licensees have to do which ties in
with this and [licensing] have got a lot of hands on know-
ledge of individual premises, individual licensees’
(EHP4). This view was shared by a couple of proprietors
‘if a policeman had come in and done that study with
me I would have found it more appropriate than the
EHP woman coming in to do it’ (LP22) who were con-
cerned that SMILE drew more agencies into a field
already negatively affected by increased funding for po-
lice and local authorities in licensing over the last decade
‘I think that perhaps bringing more bodies into the kind
of …..maybe….Yeah I think that, as I say at the moment
there is way too much conditions on licenses and stuff
like that’ (LP157). SMILE also introduced or reinforced
appreciation of the value of multi-agency work, especially
for EHPs with similar earlier experience ‘people like the
health board, the police, you know fire service, other agen-
cies … you know getting everybody interested’ (EHP17).
EHPs also maintained ‘it is important to forge these links
with everybody … so that they can actually, you know raise
concerns and perhaps you know change license conditions
and deal with all these things rather than you know do it
in isolation’ (EHP10).
Discussion
Given the lack of rigorous international evidence identi-
fying effective statutory interventions for preventing
alcohol-related violence, these findings provide import-
ant process data for the interpretation of the forthcom-
ing paper on the effectiveness of SMILE. Such
randomised controlled trials of unproven interventions
are important from an ethical point of view in condi-
tions of social equipoise [24] to identify potential bene-
fits or harms. Without process data, it will not be
possible to explain why the intervention may or may not
have been effective, for whom and in what circum-
stances [15, 25]. In itself this study adds to our know-
ledge of how to implement interventions addressing
factors in and around licensed premises and highlights
key learning that has generalizable implications for the
future development and implementation of interventions
drawing on broken windows [13, 14] and social control
theory [15, 16] delivered by statutory bodies across cul-
tures and contexts.
It is clear that the statutory nature of the intervention,
drawing on formal social control mechanisms, facilitated
high levels of reach, particularly when compared to re-
sults from the previous feasibility trial and reflects simi-
lar international studies of statutory social control
interventions [26, 27]. However this finding needs to be
considered alongside knowledge of the high numbers of
closures that occurred before the intervention could be
delivered, instances of premise inaccessibility, and the
very small number of premises that refused to take part.
Such findings demand some consideration of heavier en-
forcement policies for externally driven formal social
control, especially for the minority of refusers for whom
a multi-agency approach involving wider authorities may
encourage full participation. In this, it reflects inter-
national findings that highlight the importance of the
police in delivering interventions drawing on social con-
trol approaches and broken windows theory [28]. Inde-
pendent premises seemed to have the strongest need for
such an intervention. The risk-audit identified multiple
areas of concern in three quarters of the independent
intervention premises included in the process evaluation,
with SMILE acceptability lower and receipt poorer in
such premises, whose managers tended to see the inter-
vention as an added burden that they lacked the re-
sources to respond to. Such cases demand consideration
of more complex formal social control interventions that
include additional resources/support to promote formal
and informal social control within premises. There were
also concerns of whether the police data were robust
enough to identify and reach the most at-risk premises.
Such anxieties led to associated questions about whether
the intervention was targeted at those in most need of it.
In terms of intervention fidelity and the subsequent
dose, some EHPs demonstrated lack of confidence in
dealing with alcohol related violence at the start of the
project, and although the training appeared to allay con-
cerns, many practitioners subsequently relied on advice
and guidance rather than using enforcement to deliver
the intervention regardless of the risk scores they allo-
cated. In this, the audit was used as a motivational ra-
ther than enforcement tool and the action plans were
not delivered with fidelity. At the end of the project
many EHP concerns about dealing with alcohol-related
violence remained. This may well change as responsibil-
ity for alcohol related violence is further embedded in
organisational practice but, significantly, there was
strong support for a multiagency approach, including li-
censing officers and police, to support enforcement and
full intervention implementation. This highlights the
need for the development and evaluation of multi-
agency rather than single agency interventions in this
area as recommended by the World Health Organisation
[29] and, in terms of research design, it suggests the
need for a longer period of adoption for new practices to
be embedded before any evaluation is undertaken.
Such implications should be considered in light of a
number of study limitations. As highlighted above the
first of these concerns bias. The loss to follow up of
premises through closures and a small but significant
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number of premises who were either inaccessible or re-
fused to take part in the study may be associated with
unmeasured response bias. Additionally, although there
was an attempt to sample a diverse range of premises
types for the process evaluation, it maybe that participa-
tion was associated with an additional level of response
bias. In terms of design, it should be noted that premises
level data was collected from a relatively small number
of bars and clubs compared to the number receiving the
intervention due to pragmatic and cost considerations.
Although this allowed an examination of the processes
of receipt and implementation, process data for a greater
number or indeed all premises would provide a more
comprehensive understanding. In a similar way, observa-
tional work examining audit delivery and premises re-
ceipt would have provided additional understanding.
Finally, although the pragmatic nature of the study did
not allow it, a longer period of pre-intervention research,
where existing practices and assessment and review of
new practices may have facilitated understanding and an
opportunity to address implementation barriers.
Conclusion
Alcohol is bought and consumed in premises in most
cities around the world, reflecting the ubiquity of a
global alcohol industry and highlighting the need for
interventions internationally to address alcohol related
violence. It is clear that the statutory nature of the inter-
vention led to high reach. Such approaches appear a ne-
cessary pre-requisite for licenced premises interventions.
Study findings suggest that environmental health is an
agency that possesses the potential infrastructure, ex-
pertise, statutory powers and skills to deliver such inter-
ventions in the UK, but it was also clear that a multi-
agency approach and longer term integration into pro-
fessional practice is necessary. In the absence of this and
the failure of a key mechanism of action there are con-
cerns whether the intervention was of sufficient intensity
to promote effectiveness.
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